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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
John P. Huttman
San Francisco State University

"Inequality is what economics should be all about," argued
It isn't, because concern with the pattthe late R.H. Tawney.
erns of distribution of wealth and income is shared with proConcentration
duction, upon which consumption is contingent.
of wealth and unequal levels of income largely reflect the patterns of returns to labor and investment in a traditional capitalist economy.
Additionally, income tromfers, rationalized on
other than a labor or investment compensation basis, alter the
patterns of income and wealth holdings.
Pronounced economic inequality, while prevalent in capitalist economies, would not
seem to result from the market mechanism.
Broadly based ownership of the means of production, by workers and others, perhaps
linked to co-determination schemes for direction of production
policies, has evolved as a potential alternative to wealth concentrations of an extreme form as a source of investment capital.
It should be cautioned that the feasibility of this investment
source substitute for wealth formation has not yet been fully
established.
Capitalism, through either compensatory redistribution
schemes or restructuring of the capital mobilization mechanism,
embodies the potential for eliminating, or at least reducing,
economic inequality as the basis and outcome of the market oriented production system.
Socialism, incorporating state control
of productive capacity, avoids reliance on capital generation
through private sources.
Therefore, the socialist system does
not promulgate economic inequality through personal control of
and compensation for the output of capital equipment.
However,
in socialist, as in capitalist societies, unequal compensation
to labor, and to those incapable of labor, is a source of economic inequality. It is evident that some degree of economic inequality exists in all modern industrial economies, socialist
or capitalist, and in most pre-industrial economies as well,
except perhaps for those operating at a primitive level.
Considered in this context, it appears that the matter of economic
inequality may be examined from these three vantage points: the
desirability of lessening, or even eliminating, economic inequality4 the methodology by which economic inequality is assessed;
the devices by which economic inequality may be alleviated.
Enhancement of economic equality, within a narrow spread of
incomes, is a commonly eulogized ideal of a variety of societies,
including: agricultural systems based on a yeomanry, established
on family sized farms; systems largely composed of craftsmen,
shopkeepers and other small-scale entrepeneurs; modern capitalist systems where the bulk of the population prefers self-identification as 'middle class'; socialist societies incorporating
equalitarian goals. The socialist society has an explicit source
of inspsration, the Marxist edict: "From each according to his
ability, to each according to his needs."
Equalitarian aims are
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more subdued in non-socialist societies, although tradItlOin
obstenof a religious and moral nature may act to discourage
needs of
tatiousness, acquisitiveness and indifference to the
others.
Behavioral scientists attribute some part of the total
of property and person related crimes and other anti-social
behavior to the poverty experiences of the perpetrators.
Economists and others cite the incapacitating effects, in terms of production and consumption, of poverty upon the work
The poor may be denied development of
and lives of people.
talent and ability, condemned to perform at low levels of proAlthough
ductivity, and make uninformed choices as consumers.
more respect is usually reserved for the wealthy, their inRecipients
adequacies also occasionally come under scrutiny.
of inherited rather than productively earned assets are commonly held in low esteem by economists because these beneficiaries had not acquired their wealth as the result of astute marEconomists sometimes express a low regard of
ket decisions.
the consumer expenditures, seemingly on items of increasing
triviality, originating with the wealthy.
It might be contended that a society with income and wealth distribution falling within a narrow range is likely to
accomodate to patterns of social homogeneity, with uniform
values prevailing. Whether or not this is perceived as desirable will depend upon the values of the observers. If critics
feel that increasing affluence, accompanied by expanded levels
of personal consumption, may corrupt or debilitate ideology
or morality, they may be persuaded to argue for diminished
However, it should be noted that no definmaterial demands.
itive connection has been established between levels of material consumption and degrees of affinity to ideological or
moral principle.
Narrowing of the range of income and wealth would not
go unnoticed by others than the previously poor, who would
be justified in celebrating their improved circumstances, and
the previously rich, who would have cause to lament their
How profound an economic impact such a narrowing
decline.
might have would depend upon a number of factors, including
the former range, the pre and post range contraction distribution patterns of income and wealth, the sources of investAggregate consumer
ment and the patterns of consumption.
demand could be importantly effected by a narrowing of income and wealth range, unless offsetting measures are inaugPurchases of new automobiles and expensive appliancurated.
es, as well as investment in owner-occupied housing, are disproportionately concentrated among more affluent elements in
Increased demand for public goods could have
most societies.
a compensatory effect but, even then, there would be costs
In the absence of effective offassociated with dislocation.
setting public demand, diminished private demand for output
would have repercussions in terms of reduced investment and
employment-earnings opportunities.
Goals of removing families and individuals from near subsistence levels and from positions of extreme affluence are
accorded different levels of priority under different economic
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systems and different Societies. Accessibility to economic
opportunity - epitomized as 'equal opportunity' - is implicit
in the rationale of the framework of both capitalism and socialism.
A divergence between theoretical and operational models resulting from the inaccessibility of workers to appropriate positions commensurate with ability potential is likely
to diminish the efficiency of the system.
Endorsement and implementation of meritocracy-based hierarchies in production
firms, government administration and other activities, reflect
general acquiescence of this concept in modern economies. Extremes of wealth and income, existing on a large scale, tend
to frustrate the installation of meritocratic schemes.
The urgency for lessening economic inequality, at least in
part, is a function of range and distribution of income.
A
predominantly affluent society, with relatively few people
experiencing extremes of great poverty or wealth, may be noticeably unresponsive to demands for the elimination of these
extremes.
In contrast, demands for redistribution may be
easily stimulated in a generally poor society having a very
wide range of economic inequality.
Ironically, confiscation
of the assets of a wealthy few would probably make only a
weakly perceptible contribution to the welfare of a poverty
stricken mass.
With respect to the pressures generated for
redistribution, anticipated effective gain may be subordinated to achievement of non-economic goals.
Class consciousness
and ideological awareness may represent important forces in
stimulating change, irrespective of their economic effects.
Relatively superior economic position may generate satisfaction among the recipients of material benefits, based upon
the relative deprivation of others.
Economic disparity, per
se, as the source of incentive is not an attractive proposition.
It is conceivable that individuals may be motivated to perform
economic activities primarily because the rewards achieved greatly exceed those conferred on others for performing other tasks.
Consumption, in turn, may be pleasurable with the knowledge it
is denied to all but a few others at that level.
The noneconomic counterpart to such economic response may be identified with assumption of political position for the authority the
holder may exert over others.
Argument for retention of economic inequality founded on disparity-related satisfaction has
its origins in a pre-industrial mentality, with more concern
displayed for the arrangements than the magnitude of output of
production. While modern economic man is formulated as rational, some residual of economic disparity orientation is detectable in industrialized capitalist and socialist societies.
Enthusiasm for defending retntion or initiating reform of
patterns of economic inequality frequently exceeds the ability
of participants in the debate to define and analyze the problem.
Unless we can conceptualize the nature of economic inequality,
we cannot be confident we are employing the appropriate strategies and are directing them to the intended objectives.
Lorenz
Curve analysis is designed to measure with coefficients and
graphical portrayal the extent of economic inequality.
In terms
of the Lorenz Curve diagram, cumulative percentage of households
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is measured along the horizontal axis, from left to right, and
cumulative percentage of wealth or of income is measured along
Because the
the right side vertical axis, from bottom to top.
vertical axis measures either income or wealth, but not both
simultaneously, one graph can only show equality in the holding of wealth or equality in the distribution of income. The
entire length of each axis is equal to one hundred percent of
households, or of wealth or of income, respectively. A diagonal
line connects the point of zero percentage of households with
the point of one hundred percent of wealth or of income, to fom
The origin,
a triangle of the lower right half of the graph.
in the lower right hand corner of the graph, is formed by the
juncture of the axis lines
Perfect equality in the distribution of wealth or of income
would occur in the case where the Lorenz Curve coincided with
the diagonal line, with cumulative percentages of households
having proportionate cumulative percentages of income or of
wealth. When either wealth or income is disproportionately
distributed, with a larger share to part of the househblds and
a smaller share to the rest, the Lorenz Curve assumes a bowed
shape, convex with respect to the origin. The greater the inwealth or income, the more prowith respect to either
equality
to note
is interesting
It
nounced the bowed shape or convexity.
the Lorenz Curve has not
in the case of the United States,
that
changed its bowed shape perceptibly over the third quarter of
the Twentieth Century; its shape has apparently not changed subOver this period
stantially over the first half of the century.
the average size of households has decreased, with diminished
average family size and an increase in the share of unrelated
The increased share of total
individuals of total households.
households represented by unrelated individuals is mainly
accounted for by the increasing numbers of surviving elderly
and, to a lesser extent, by divorce and other factors. Translated from household into population terms, the Lorenz Curve
would have a tendency to show greater inequality, in the context of income shares, because of the disproportionate concentration of elderly and the persistence of larger family size
in lower income categories. Tendencies for contrasting asset
holding extremes among the elderly than the population at large
suggests that wealth shares might appear even more unequal in
Income, although not assets,
population than household terms.
of those at the lower end of the economic scale would be increased somewhat with the inclusion of various forms of public
Deficiencies in data - and its
assistance, in kind and in cash.
format - for income distribution, and particularly for the distribution of wealth shares, make such conclusions somewhat conjectural.
Comventional Lorenz Curve analysis is inadequate for assesSment of economic inequality because it deals with income or with
wealth distribution at one point in time instead of over a
The lifetime measure
period of useful comparison - a lifetime.
has greater validity than one point in time because household
income will change over the length of the productive and nonDifferent types of
productive years of the household members.
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households, in terms of occupations and other characteristics
of members, will experience different patterns of lifetime
earning or wealth distribution patterns.
Manual workers will
have generally earlier entry into the workforcewad an earlier
peaking of annual earnings than will professional workers who
characteristically defer early entry and earnings for acquisition of additional qualifications.
The typically higher peak
annual earnings during advanced years of the professional worker represent compensation for earlier non-remunerated training
periods.
More advanced preparation embodies productivity in
the professional worker superior to that of the manual worker,
so that while the lifetime earnings of professional and manual
worker are likely to be closer together than their earnings at
any one point, they are unlikely to be equal.
Uorkers in the
same experience-preparation stream, who might have somewhat
similar lifetime earnings have income discrepancies most likely
at one point in time because of different entry dates and seniority-experience wage increments.
Lifetime rather than current earnings provides a more realistic framework for assessing the distribution of income inequality because the income available to the non-productive elderly,
normally in any modern society, can seldom be expected to remain
at the level of prior productive years, unless exceptional provision is undertaken.
The economic needs of the elderly have
been interpreted as diminishing with age, presumably reinforced
by frugality in many cases.
However, it would seem at least
equally plausible that the elderly, in these cases, are merely
accomodating to their contracting resources.
Uncertainty about
the continuity of public forms of assistance, particularly if
elderly persons had been confronted with adverse experience in
this respect, would only seem to reinforce their apprehensiveness about the source of future income.
Unclear prospects for
survival into some specific future period, concern for solvency
to cover unexpected events, ultimately funerals, and bequests
for relatives, compel many elderly to conserve dwindling estates.
In terms of wealth holdings, immobility of assets of the elderly
may tend to exaggerate the value of their accumulations.
Convertibility requirements of an urgent nature may substantially
depreciate estates.
If the elderly, generally, were to indulge
in the levels of health care and other services and goods required to prolong health, effectively resist senility and postpone
death, albeit temporarily, it would be reasonable to expect their expenditures would greatly exceed income and wealth in most
cases.
Examined in a current context, the wealth shares of the
elderly are disportionately greater than the younger households.
But wealth accumulation for similar stream households, having
similar preferences, would be expected to tend toward cm
r-grnce
over a lifetime period.
Current income inequality and wealth disparity may be attributable to family size, just as it can be attributed in part to
age and work entry date differences.
Child bearing and rearing families represent a high opportunity cost, particularly
with a rising rate of female labor force participation, since
mothers frequently effectively sacrifice income for child care.
-51-

Presumably, the satisfaction derived from juvinile offspring
compensates for potential earning losses which serve to reinforce current and even lifetime household income disparities.
Small family size permits increased capacity for wealth accumulation, as compared with large family size, even though the
per capita consumption levels may exceed those of the large.
Household preference patterns with respect to consumption
and saving offer partial explanation of disparities of wealth
distribution, in current and, more particularly, lifetime terms,
in which the impact may be more obvious.
Wealth holdings are
disproportionately concentrated with the elderly - or, more
accurately, with some elderly - as compared with the general
non-elderly households.
Some of this accumulation of wealth
is attributable to inheritance and some through the appreciation of invested wealth.
And the elderly have simply had longer periods in which to accumulate wealth.
Neglecting the
important elements of inheritance and appreciation, it is
obvious that at least some inequality in the holding of wealth
in a current context disappears when viewed in terms of lifetime saving. The current inequality of wealth holdings due
to restraint of consumption in favor of savings tends to perpetuate and strengthen over the lifetime period.
Income disparities, examined on a current or even a lifetime basis, may reflect voluntary as well as involuntary economic inequality.
Some individuals trade off income for leisure.
People quite frequently choose occupations in which they earn
less than the maximum they are capable of securing on the job
market.
Their reaons for doing so may appear to be quite reasonable: they m~y oprfer to avoid high tension positions; they
reject working conditions they view as intolerable; they prefer
lower paying creative activities; they do not wish to exert
authority.
Within national manpower requirements, modern economies generally recognize the advantages of workers selecting their
own jobs, even though, inadvertently and through choice, some
may achieve lower productivity and income as a result.
A dynamic economy, characterized by continuing economic
growth and technological innovation, will have an earning capacity bias favoring later entrants.
The entry earnings of current
entrants, in this situation, would be expected to exceed the
entry level earnings of those recruited to comparable positions
at earlier dates.
In terms of academically acquired technical
skills, individuals become conveyors of change and rewards to
knowledge become an integral part of payments to entrant technically trained workers.
Workers doing jobs of similar complexity in newer industries might, in general, expect higher
earnings than their counterparts in older industries. Workers
with more capital equipment supporting their jobs have greater
likelihood of high earnings than those with less capital equipment at their disposal, which is more likely to be the case
within the same industry for the later entrant.
In both capitalism and socialism, there is a reluctance to divert, at the
expense of the recent entrant, some of this earning increase
to more veteran workers.
The sheer complexity of calculation
of the division
to be made,
in addition to such factors
as labor
morale, discourage this.
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A Lorenz Curve adjusted to measure lifetime earnings or
wealth accumulation would be expected to have less convexity
with respect to its origin than would a curve measuring current income or wealth holdings.
Households would be expected to have more similarity with respect to income or wealth
over a lifetime than at a particular point in time.
Lifetime
income and wealth calculations present formidible data collection problems as well as problems of a methodological nature,
as to what constitutes a household or what period of time
actually represents a lifetime for a household composed of
different age groups, and entering and exiting members. Conceptually, however, lifetime comparisons have greater validity than current comparisons.
Briefly reviewed, lifetime
earnings or wealth holdings will differ as between households
because of different workforce entry dates, compensation for
work deferred training and productivity potential, savings consumption pattern variations, leisure and occupational preferences, length of periods for wealth accumulating opportunities, household size and numbers of working members, and
other factors.
Current income or wealth measurements distort
the degree of economic inequality between households because
they involve only one 'slice' of time, as compared with lifetime measures reflecting different stages of wealth and earning experiences over a prolonged interval.
Inequalities with respect to lifetime earnings and wealth
accumulation are likely to persist, to at least some degree,
in all modern industrial societies, whether capitalist or socialist.
Diminished disparities in pay scales, greater conformity to family size norms, reduced opportunities for consumption - savings variations and the substitution of public goods
and services for some share of private, can act to alleviate
household economic inequality.
Some part of this inequality
is inevitable, however, because of differing preferences for
training and occupation, consumption patterns and the unlikely universal coincidence of family size.
Authorities in even
more ideologically doctrinaire systems would undoubtedly be
reluctant to introduce the costly and unpopular instruments
required to attempt to establish economic equality as between
households.
The inevitability of household lifetime economic
inequality tends to magnify differences between households in
terms of current economic inequality.
Economic inequality is only partial explainable by inevitable differences from a household lifetime perspective or
from the somewhat exaggerated current income and wealth holding view.
In addition to the differences attributable to households and the job market structure, previously referred to,
inheritance and earnings differentials unrelated to work performance, training and responsibility, would appear to be major
explanatory variables.
The first, inheritance, is obvious with
respect to its role in perpetuating economic inequality.
As
families pass along wealth, offspring are provided with unearned advantages.
These benefits can be translated by the
beneficiaries into attractive earning opportunities or they
can be parlayed into yet greater holdings of assets.
Socialist
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societies may be less tolerant of inheritance than are capitalist societies, but no modern industrial societies are likely
to allow assets to be transmitted from source to beneficiary
On the other hand, few societies, regardcompletely intact.
less of ideology, are dispossed to the confiscation of all
And wealth inheritance has its
forms of inheritable assets.
equivalence in terms of position. Parents entrenched in
positions of prestige or prominence, with associated wealth
or perogatives, enhance the probability their offspring will
rise to comparable positions, under socialism as well as
under capitalism.
Economic theory, in spite of a huge volume of literature
dealing with the subject has little to contribute, of an appliTheory
cable nature, to the question of work-related rewards.
concerned with wage rates in accordance with marginal productivity has limited influence with respect to the hiring and
In practice, it is
wage determination decisions of firms.
difficult to establish the marginal contributions of labor in
It is no less difficult to relate
modern complex industry.
to output and profits the earnings of management than of proBonuses and salary increments may rise more
duction workers.
rapidly in periods of increasing profits but they are unlikely to decline dramatically - or at all, for that matter - with
Upper echelon management is the
reduced profit or even loss.
main influence with respect to the level of its own remuneration, at least under capitalism, and tends to be somewhat genUnder socialism as well the earnings of
erous in this regard.
higher management substantially exceed the incomes of blue
In both socialist and capitalist systems, the
collar workers.
privileges and benefits extended to senior management, supplementary to salaries, further reinforce economic disparities.
Monopoly in the labor market, under capitalism, creates
disparities in the incomes of workers in production and service
activities, even though these workers may perform comparable
Discriminatory practices
tasks and have similar skill levels.
based on race, sex and age are examples of forms of monopoly
in the job market as are labor organization restrictions on
Professional workers, through their
entry into employment.
organizations, also employ monopolistic tactics to control
Entry or promotion eligibility
their levels of remuneration.
in certain types of work, based on political affiliation or
sympathy, could conceivably represent an analagous monopolistic restriction in a doctrinaire socialist economy. Arbitrary
disparities and monopolistic practices with respect to income,
and inheritance with respect to wealth, would appear to be
important determinants of economic inequality not encompassed
by the area of inevitable inequality analyzed earlier.
There is no formula for determining the range of income
and wealth disparities tolerable within a 'just' society.
Economists are capable of specifying optimal wealth holding
and income distribution patterns with respect to designated
charactistics of the economy and identified goals, such as
But the econmaximizing growth or employment opportunities.
omist cannot pretend to be able to identify the wealth

holding and income distribution patterns which would 'optimize'
Abstract models borrsatisfaction among the population.
owed from utility, indifference curve and modern welfare
theory shed little light on practical problems of economic
distribution and recipient satisfaction.
Questions raised regarding the relevance of economics in
the construction of an ideal pattern of wealth holding and
income distribution are not intended to convey an overall
sense of dismay about the applicability of the discipline to
problems associated with economic inequality.
If economists
are incapable of providing practical definitions of economic
'optimality', in terms of the relationship of income and wealth patterns to satisfaction, it should be remembered that
other social scientists are also inadequate to the task of
formulating an operational model of the 'just' society. The
answers to questions such as what constitutes an ideal society
reflect value judgements.
Social scientists can analytically
describe an issue, trace its ramifications and suggest its
consequences, costs and benefits, but the ultimate choice must
be made by those who anticipate benefit to society and, perhaps,
themselves.
The matter of dealing with economic inequality is somewhat simplified if attention is focussed on the areas susceptible to change rather than on the whole, including the
intractable areas where some degree of economic inequality,
even in lifetime rather than current terms, is inevitable.
Pay-off to effort is likely to materialize with attention to
the concentration of wealth due to inheritance and high income
due to excessive reward
and monopolistic practices, on the
one hand, and on the other poverty due to causes other than
voluntary work abstinence and large family size.
Any permanent solution to the poverty-related problems of work evading
employables and expanding families, while they might include
material assistance, are also linked to work orientation
counseling and family planning guidance, respectively.
Generous rewards, in the form of earnings and wealth
accumulation which are unrelated to productive motivation and
are not the result of self-accumulation, can be reduced through
the instrument of taxation.
Inheritance tax laws can be strengthened to restrict estate transfers to modest levels.
The
net effect of federal taxes on personal income in the United
States, on balance, appears to be that essentially the same
rate is levied on income within a broad range, while state
and local taxes are regressive somewhat with respect to lower
income households.
The internal revenue service, if it operates reasonably cheaply and efficiently, as in the case of the
United States, represents an accessible mechanism for redistributing income and wealth holdings to some extent.
There
would seem to be some opportunity to reduce exemptions and
deductions for income and for investment of higher income households.
However, any significant changes are bound to inconvenience long established beneficiaries.
For instance, elimination of interest deductions and local tax credits on property of homeowners, which are of disproportionately greater
benefit to the wealthy than the poor, would most likely have
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a disruptive impact not only on the wealthy, but on the whole
Nonetheless, the tax structure modification alterneconomy.
ative to other forms of economic redistribution retains considerable potential.
The negative income tax permits the transfer of income,
mechanically and inexpensively, as merely the reversal of the
conventional flow from taxpayer to internal revenue service.
The extension of income in this manner would probably appear
as more 'legitimate' to the general public than the forms of
It would remove stigma-ridden
assistance it would replace.
intermediaries, although in the process it would eliminate
useful as well as redundant aspects of official communication
The patterns of consumption by the poor, rewith the poor.
inforced by the transfer of income, would be largely indeInsofar as the poor are intimipendent of any authority.
dated or co-erced by visible echelons of functionaries, the
But, to some extent,
benefits of their removal are obvious.
poverty may be at least reinforced by the decisions of its
victims, so there is no assurance that funds transferred in
this manner would be fully effective in relieving poverty
situations.
A negative income tax related to earnings permits income
transfers to the poor without supressing their motivation to
Incentives
wor, in cases where they are eligible to do so.
to increased earnings are built into transfer scales, so that
each additional amount of income earned, to a specified level,
When earnings are low,
reduces transfers by a smaller amount.
transfer reductions would be slight, whereas transfer paymante would be reduced substantially as income rose to a more
However, the comprehensive adoption of
nearly adequate level.
a negative income tax scheme must also be linked to minimum
legislation sufficient for assuring that a negative
wage
income tax for the working poor does not merely become a supplement to inadequate work remuneration, a sort of modern
'Speenhamland plan'.
The involuntarily unemptoyed and those ineligible for
work by virtue of age, disability, number of dependents and
similar reasons cannot rely on any objective economist-conceived formula to reveal the levels of income transfers to
Economists are limited to
which they are to be entitled.
describing the living conditions which certain levels of transIn the case of families,
fers can purchase for recipients.
extend transfers at a
at least, it would seem reasonable t
level which might offer fair prospects for offspring to escape
Provision of universal essential goods
poverty in adulthood.
arI services, particularly such elements as medical care,
sh~oull basically be premised upon economies of scale and
But there may also be spillbenefits to aggregate society.
The poor would derive additional
over benefits to the poor.
benefits from any differences between a universally accessible health service, presumably with public scrutiny of quality,
and a service reserved exclusively for low income clients.
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